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Lorbiecki: Indian Sovereignty versus Oklahoma's Gambling Laws

INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS OKLAHOMA'S
GAMBLING LAWS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Bingo is currently one of the most controversial topics in Indian
affairs.' Approximately sixty tribes throughout the United States conduct bingo games on their property and of those tribes, twenty-four are
in Oklahoma. 2 Many of the tribes have contracted with outside firms to
construct the halls and manage the games. 3 The firms are given a percentage of the proceeds from the games as compensation for their services.4 The remaining profits are used to guarantee the economic selfsufficiency of the tribes.5 Non-Indians, as well as Indians, are allowed to
participate in the games.6
Indian bingo has been the target of extensive debate in recent years.7

Not only have community groups and charitable organizations criticized
1. See, eg., 17 Am.INDIAN L. NEWSLETrER 11, 11 (1984) (Responses to Indian bingo have
included: civil and charitable organizations pressuring state legislatures to outlaw the operations;
law enforcement officials fearing that organized crime will infiltrate and eventually control Indian
bingo; and the United States House pressing to pass H.R. 4566, the Indian Gambling Control Act).
2. Peterson, Indian Land Bonanza, Tulsa Tribune, Mar. 30, 1984, at H.1, col. 2.
3. See, eg., Pratter, "Bingo" to be Shouted Soon In Creek Nation Hall, Tulsa World, Oct. 25,
1984, at F.1, col. 2 (Creek Nation in Oklahoma has contracted with Indian Country USA to help
finance its bingo hall; Indian Country, in turn, will receive 40% of the profits); Wolfe, Instant Winner,Tulsa Tribune, Apr. 9, 1984, at B.1, col. 2 (Otoe-Missouria tribe in Oklahoma has entered into a
five-year contract with a group of non-Indian investors comprising a company called North American Indigo, Inc.); Diebolt, Indians Bingo Again, Tulsa Tribune, Mar. 19, 1983, at A.2, col. 2.
(Quapaws have entered into a five-year contract with Central Plains Management, a firm which will
fund the bingo hall and receive 65% of the profits).
4. See supra note 3.
5. See, eg., Pratter, 1,000 Folks Put Their Money on New Creek Bingo Game, Tulsa World,
Nov. 18, 1984, at A.4, col. 2 (profits from the bingo operation will be used for Creek tribal projects
such as health care and education); Diebolt, supra note 3, at A.2, col. 2 (bingo profits will be used to
help pay for health, education and welfare of the Quapaw tribe).
6. See Pratter, supra note 5, at A.1, col. 3.
7. See, eg., Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1982) (bingo is not contrary to public policy, thus games operated by the
Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians do not violate the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970)), cert denied, 103 S.Ct. 2091 (1983); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (operation of bingo hall on Seminole reservation found to be outside of Florida's jurisdiction), cert denied, 102 S.Ct. 1717 (1982); Oneida Tribe
of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (Wisconsin's regulation of bingo is a
civil regulation and thus cannot be enforced against Oneida Reservation); Penobscot Nation v.
Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983) (bingo games run by Penobscot Indian Nation found to be a
violation of Maine's gambling laws).
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the games,' but law enforcement and government officials have become
pitted against tribal leaders.9 To law enforcement officials, bingo is illegal gambling, likely to attract organized crime. 10 To the cities, counties,
and states involved, Indian bingo represents the usurpation of their right
to govern, thus constituting an intrusion on local control and state plenary power." To the Indians, their advocates, and the federal courts,
bingo is a lawful method to raise revenue for faltering tribal economies. 12
Oklahoma law currently authorizes bingo games conducted by "any
organization that is a bona fide religious, charitable, labor, fraternal, educational organization or any branch, lodge, chapter or auxiliary thereof
or any veterans' or firemen's organization which operates without profit
to its members."' 3 There are few distinguishing features between bingo
played on tribal lands in Oklahoma and the games played at the American Legion or Catholic churches, except that jackpots of $100,000 are
currently found in Indian bingo games" and outside firms share in the
profits.15 Oklahoma bingo laws limit jackpots to $200 per game and the
aggregate amount of all games in a single bingo session is not to exceed
$1,000.16 The laws prohibit anyone other than a charitable organization
from having a financial interest in bingo profits." Oklahoma bingo laws
further provide that no part of the bingo profits are to inure to the benefit
of any individual member or employee of the charitable organization.'8
This Comment discusses the concept of tribal sovereignty as it relates to the enforcement of Oklahoma's bingo laws on Indian land. Various approaches used by other states in asserting jurisdiction over Indian
land will be explored and addressed in relation to Indian bingo. It is
urged that Oklahoma allow Indians to operate bingo halls free from state
interference.
8. See, eg., Pratter, Indian Bingo Termed Threat to Veteran and Civic Games, Tulsa World,
Nov. 19, 1984, at A.1, col. 1 (local veterans' groups and civic organizations which have used bingo as
a fundraiser claim that their economic base has been threatened by the big jackpots offered at the
Creek Indian bingo hall).
9. DeDominicis, Betting On Indian Rights, 3 CAL. LAW. 29, 29 (1983).

10. Id.
11. Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 995.1 (Supp. 1984).
Program for Otoe-Missouria Bingo, Red Rock, Oklahoma (Apr. 7-29, 1984).
See supra note 3.
OKLA.STAT. tit. 21, § 995.10 (Supp. 1984).
Id. § 995.1.
Id.
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II.
A.

THE CONCEPT OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

The Origins of Tribal Sovereignty

The aggressive attempts by state governments to extend their laws
into Indian territory are of great concern to tribal authorities.19
Although the Supreme Court has established a shield to protect Indian
tribes from state regulatory and administrative intrusions,2 ° Indians continue to feel the threat of state encroachment into tribal activities.2 1 Tribal sovereignty and state encroachment are at the crux of the Indian
bingo controversy. The Indians maintain that due to tribal sovereignty
they have a right to conduct bingo operations free from state interference. 22 The states, on the other hand, would like to, at a minimum,
regulate the games under the purview of their gambling legislation.2 3
Johnson v. M'Intosh2' was the Supreme Court's first attempt to define the federal government's relationship to Indian nations. While the
19. See generally Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing Problems of
State EncroachmentInto Indian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 65 (1980) (author explores the role
the Supreme Court has played in providing Indian nations with protection against attempted state
intrusions into Indian country).
20. See, eg., Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980) (Indian trader statutes and their implementing regulations, as federal law, preempt the imposition of
state tax); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148-51 (1980) (state taxation on
motor carriers who used Bureau and tribal roads exclusively amounted to double taxation and was,
therefore, preempted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme); Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965) (Indians may, in general, run the reservation
and its affairs free from state control).
21. See, eg., Moapa Band of Paiute Indians v. United States Dep't of Interior, 747 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1984) (Paiute Indians enjoined from running houses of prostitution on tribal land in Nevada); Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.
1982) (California attempted to enjoin the Barona Group of Mission Indians from operating bingo
games on the reservation), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2091 (1983); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (Florida attempted to enjoin Seminole tribe from conducting
bingo games on tribal property), cert denied, 102 S. Ct. 1717 (1982); Oneida Tribe of Indians v.
Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (Wisconsin attempted to enjoin Oneida tribe from
conducting bingo games on Indian land).
22. See, eg., Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712, 714 (W.D. Wis. 1981)
(enforcement of state bingo laws on Indian reservation would infringe on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them); Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478,
482 (Me. 1983) (Penobscot Nation argued that it could run bingo games free from state regulation as
it retained all of the inherent powers recognized as an attribute of the tribe's internal sovereignty).
23. See Stephenson, Government to Watch Tulsa Bingo Hall, Tulsa World, Nov. 1, 1984, at
C.8, col. 4 (noting that in 1983, the Justice Department proposed legislation for state regulation of
Indian bingo).
24. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). In Johnson, the Piankeshan and Illinois tribes conveyed
certain parcels of land to private individuals. Id. at 550-54. Subsequently, the tribes ceded the same
land to the United States by treaty. Id. at 555-58. The Court was required to determine the validity
of the earlier conveyances from the Indian tribes to individuals. Id. at 571-72. The tribes were
found to have no independent power to sell and convey their aboriginal homelands without approval
from the federal government. Id. at 572.
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Court maintained the notion of Indian sovereignty, it recognized the colonial concept used by the European nations to partition the New
World.2" Thus, the discovery of Indian lands gave the discovering European nation title to those lands.26 Title to the lands was subject, how-

ever, to the continued right of Indian occupancy and use.2 7 As a result,
the Indians retained an interest in their lands, but the federal govern-

ment, taking the place of the first European discoverers,
retained ulti28
mate dominion over and ownership of the soil.
The federally owned land theory in Johnson formed the basis of the
Court's decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.2 9 In Cherokee Nation,
Chief Justice Marshall noted that while Indians possessed a right to oc-

cupy Indian territory, the federal government had title to the land, independent of the Indians' will.3 0 Marshall stated that the Indians'

relationship to the United States "resemble[d] that of a ward to his
guardian."3
Despite the reinforcement of the federally owned land theory in
Cherokee Nation, the tribal sovereignty concept remained strong in the
landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia.32 In Worcester, the Court held

that the State of Georgia could not enforce its laws on the Cherokee
Reservation.33 The Court stated:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force. . . . The whole intercourse between the
25. Id. at 573.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 574.
28. Id.
29. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The tribe sought to enjoin the execution of Georgia laws in Cherokee territory by claiming to be a "foreign state" within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 15-16.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id. The Court stated:
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to
it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father. They and their
country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely
under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their
lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
Id. at 17-18.
32. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In Worcester, the State of Georgia imprisoned two non-Indians
who had lived among the Cherokees with the consent of tribal authorities, but without permission
from the state in accordance with Georgia law. Id. at 532. The Court held that such imprisonment
was in violation of the constitution because the state's action infringed upon the exclusive federal
power to regulate intercourse with the Indians. Id. at 561. Such authority had been exerted in
treaties with the Cherokees and in federal laws regulating Indian affairs. Id. at 561-62.
33. Id. at 561.
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United States and this nation, is, by our34constitution and laws, vested
in the government of the United States.

Under the concept of tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes retained internal control over their reservations. This internal control was, however,

subject to limitations when the federal government had exercised its constitutional powers concerning the regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes, 5 or its power to make treaties.3 6 One commentator analyzed
the outcome in Worcester and its impact on Indian sovereignty by
stating:
Focusing heavily on the right of Indians to govern themselves internally ... [the Court] created a shield of sovereignty by which to protect Indian tribes from state encroachments. Indian sovereignty then
became multifaceted. On one hand, it was a formidable barrier to state
encroachment into its affairs; on the other hand, it was a fragile legality
capable of extinguishment if and when the federal government felt so
inclined. a7

B.

The Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty

In matters of internal self-government within tribal territory, tribal
powers are exclusive, and state law is generally inapplicable unless such
tribal powers have been limited by the incorporation of the tribes under
the sovereignty of the United States, or by federal laws and policies.3 8
For example, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,3 9 the Supreme
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
n.7 (1973), the Court stated: "The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the
subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal
responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making." For a discussion
of the source and scope of federal authority in Indian affairs, see generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 207-28 (1982).
37. Lytle, supra note 19, at 71.
38. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
39. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In Oliphant, a non-Indian was arrested by Suquamish tribal authorities for assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest. Id. at 194. After arraignment before the tribal
court, the accused was released on his own recognizance. Id In holding that the Suquamish had no
authority to try or sentence non-Indians, the Court relied on a treaty provision which required the
tribe to turn over fugitives to federal authorities. Id at 207-08. The Court stated that the treaty
provision, when "[r]ead in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which extends federal enclave law to
non-Indian offenses on Indian reservations," implied that the Suquamish had no authority to impose
penal sanctions on non-Indians. Id. at 208.
But see Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975), wherein the Court sustained the tribal arrest of a non-Indian on a non-treaty reservation for importing marijuana with
intent to distribute. Id. at 1177. A tribal police officer stopped and searched the defendant's vehicle
as it proceeded across the reservation from the direction of the Mexican border. Id at 1178. The
Court held that a tribal officer has the authority to investigate within the reservation if he has probable cause to believe state and federal laws are being violated. Id at 1181.
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Court held that tribal jurisdiction to try non-Indian criminal defendants

who were citizens of the United States was necessarily terminated by the
dependent relationship created by the tribe's incorporation into the

United States.' The Court concluded that "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States

except in a manner acceptable to Congress."41
Although the Supreme Court has long since departed from the exclusive tribal sovereignty concept that the laws of a state have no force
within reservation boundaries,4 2 it continues to recognize the principle
that Indian tribes possess "attributes of sovereignty over both their mem-

bers and their territory."43 As a result, there is no rigid rule by which to
resolve the question of whether a particular state law may be applied to

an Indian reservation or to tribal members. The status of the tribes has
been described as "an anomalous one and of complex character."'

De-

spite their partial assimilation into American governmental structure, the
tribes have retained
a semi-independent position . . not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people,
with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and
thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within
whose limits they resided.45
40. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
41. Id Other powers implicitly lost by the tribes due to their incorporation into the United
States include the power to transfer tribal land without federal approval, Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); the power to carry on relations with nations other than the United
States, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and the power to regulate non-Indi-

ans, absent an express congressional delegation, when no tribal interest justifies such regulation,
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
42. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
43. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
515). In Mazurie, non-Indians were convicted of selling liquor in Indian country without the requisite tribal permission. Id. at 547-48. The Court's decision to uphold the convictions was based on
the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1161, which states that liquor transactions in Indian country are
not subject to federal prohibitions "provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the
laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the
tribe having jurisdiction." Id. at 547 n.4. The tribe in Mazurie had adopted an ordinance permitting
liquor sales on the reservation only after a retail liquor outlet obtained both a tribal and a state
license. Id. at 548. Inasmuch as the defendant's retail liquor outlet was within Indian country, he
was subject to the authority of the tribe. Id. at 558.
44. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). In this case two Indians were convicted of murder on an Indian reservation. Id. at 375. The offense occurred on a reservation established by California statute and executive order. Id. at 381-83. The defendants argued that state
jurisdiction was exclusive, but the Court indicated that even in the absence of federal jurisdiction
under Acts of Congress, the state courts would lack jurisdiction. Id. at 384-85.
45. Id. at 381-82.
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The Supreme Court, in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,"
noted that the "semi-independent position" of Indian tribes gave rise to
two independent but related barriers to the assumption of state jurisdiction over tribal matters. 47 First, a state could not act if the field it wished

to regulate had been preempted by federal law.48 Second, a state could

not infringe upon the Indians' inherent rights of limited self-government.4 9 The two barriers were said to be independent because either barrier standing alone was a sufficient basis for holding state law

inapplicable to an activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal
members.5 0 Nonetheless, they are related in two important ways. First,
"[t]he right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and sub-

ject to the broad power of Congress."5 " Second, "traditional notions of
Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that
they have provided an important 'backdrop,'. . . against which vague or
ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured." 52
46. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
47. Id. at 142.
48. Id. Federal preemption was at the heart of the Court's decision. Arizona attempted to
impose a motor carrier license and a use fuel tax on a non-Indian logging company that had entered
into a contract with the Apache tribe to sell, load, and transport logs on the Apache Reservation.
Id. at 136. The Court held that the taxes were inapplicable to reservation logging operations due to
the fact that the federal government, having already undertaken regulation of the harvesting, sale,
and management of tribal timber, had preempted the field. Id. at 147. Thus, the state was precluded
from imposing its taxes on the reservation. Id. at 148.
49. Id. at 142; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In Williams, an Arizona court
attempted to exercise civil jurisdiction when a non-Indian sought to collect a debt for goods he sold
to an Indian couple on a Navajo Reservation. Id. at 218. The Court held that since the tribe had its
own court system, Arizona could not extend its jurisdiction to the Indian reservation. Id. at 222. To
do so would "undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." Id. at 223. The Court recognized that a
tribe's inherent sovereignty did not render all activities conducted on a reservation immune from
state regulation or action. "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always
been whether the state infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them." Id. at 220.
50. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143.
51. Id. while tribal sovereign powers may be exercised independently from federal and state
governments, they are subject to important limitations. F. COHEN, supra note 36, at 241. A tribe's
sovereign powers are subject to qualification by treaties and statutes. Idt at 241-42. For example,
the Treaty with the Navajos, Sept. 9, 1849, art. 9, 9 Stat. 974, 975, subjected the internal affairs of the
Navajos to federal control, abandoning the long-established distinction between internal and external
tribal matters. Id. at 69.
52. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143 (quoting, in part, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)). Once powers of tribal self-government have become established, subsequent federal action which might infringe upon Indian self-government is construed
narrowly in favor of retaining Indian rights. F. COHEN, supra note 36, at 224. In Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), the Indians' right to be free of state taxation in Indian country was
upheld in spite of the provisions of Public Law 280, which provided for the extension of many state
laws into Indian territory. Id. at 379. Furthermore, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302,
which applied many provisions of the Bill of Rights to tribes in the exercise of self-government was
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STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN ACTIVITIES

ON INDIAN LAND

Several states have attempted to assert jurisdiction over various Indian activities on Indian land. The following is a discussion of the approaches used by those states and an analysis as to whether Oklahoma
can rely on one or more of these approaches to assume jurisdiction over
Indian bingo.
A.

Public Law 280

States lack jurisdiction over Indian land until granted that authority
by the federal government.5 3 "Public Law 28011 embodies express congressional consent to state assumption of civil and/or criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian activities within Indian Country.""5 As
originally enacted, Public Law 280 granted states the right to assume
criminal and civil jurisdiction if the state amended any barriers in its
constitution or statutes which prevented the assumption of jurisdiction
and if the state exercised affirmative legislative action.56 However, title
IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968"7 changed the procedure set forth
under Public Law 280 by eliminating the affirmative legislative action
mandate and by requiring the consent of the tribe involved before a state
was permitted to assume criminal or civil jurisdiction over Indian territory.5 8 States with legal impediments to the assumption of jurisdiction
construed strictly in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), to limit the availability of
federal judicial review of tribal action.
53. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845 (1958)).
54. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)).
55. Ahboah v. Housing Auth. of Kiowa Tribe, 660 P.2d 625, 630 (Okla. 1983).
56. 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953), repealedby Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 403, 82 Stat. 79 (1968) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1982)). The former section provided:
The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other State not having jurisdiction
with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people
of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.
67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953). This section was directed at all states except Alaska, California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id. Under Public Law 280 as originally enacted these states
were considered "mandatory" states and were requiredto assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over
most Indian territory within their boundaries. Id. at 588.
57. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326
(1982)).
58. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1323(b), 1326 (1982) (state's criminal and/or civil laws shall be applicable in
Indian country "only where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian country
accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote").
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under title IV were given permission to amend their constitutions and
statutes to remove any such impediments. 9 The assumption of jurisdiction by such a state would not be effective until the required amendments
were made and permission was obtained from the affected tribes.6 ° Article I of the Oklahoma Constitution may constitute a legal impediment to
state jurisdiction over Indian country. It provides:
The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title in or to any unappropriated public
lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within
said limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until
the title to any such public land shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction,
disposal, and control of the United States.6 1
It is difficult to determine whether Oklahoma has assumed jurisdiction over Indian country under Public Law 280 because Oklahoma
courts disagree on the scope and effect of the "disclaimer language" in
the constitution. In State v. Littlechief,62 the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Oklahoma confirmed the trial court's dismissal of an information
which charged Littlechief with murder.6 3 In its Order Affirming Dismissal, the court found that the State of Oklahoma had no jurisdiction over
the crime. 64 The court held that the issue of jurisdiction had already
been determined by the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 65 The federal district court had noted that under the
provisions of Public Law 280 the State of Oklahoma could have unilaterally assumed jurisdiction over any Indian land within its borders at any
time between 1953 (when Public Law 280 was first enacted) and 1968
(when Public Law 280 was amended) had the Oklahoma Constitution
been amended as required.6 6 "After the enactment of Title IV in 1968
59. Id. § 1324 (1982) (states have the power "to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of
civil or criminal jurisdiction").
60. See Ahboah v. Housing Auth. of Kiowa Tribe, 660 P.2d 625, 630 (Okla. 1983); 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1324, 1326 (1982).
61. OKLA. CONST. art I, § 3.
62. 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
63. Id. at 264.
64. Id.
65. Id. The issue presented to both the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and the United
States district court was whether the crime charged occurred in "Indian country" as defined by
statutes of the United States. Id. The district court found that since the murder occurred on Indian
Trust Land which was part of an original allotment and held in trust for the tribe by the federal
government, the federal court, and not the State of Oklahoma, had jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. at 264-65.
66. Id. at 265.
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Oklahoma had to amend its constitution and the affected tribes had to
consent to the State's assumption of jurisdiction over them before the

State could acquire jurisdiction over 'Indian country.' ,67 The State of
Oklahoma, however, has never acted pursuant to Public Law 280 or title
IV to assume jurisdiction over Indian territories.6 8

The Supreme Court asserts a different view of the constitutional disclaimer. In Currey v. Corporation Commission,6 9 the court interpreted
Oklahoma's disclaimer of right and title to Indian lands as a disclaimer
of proprietary rather than governmental interests. 70 The court stated

that "[t]he State may well waive its claim to any right or title to [Indian]
lands and still have all of its political or police power with respect to the
actions of the people on those lands, as long as that does not affect the
71
title to the land."
Not only is there an apparent conflict between the Supreme Court's

interpretation of Public Law 280 and Oklahoma's constitutional disclaimer and the Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation, there appears

to be some confusion within the Court of Criminal Appeals itself. Some
criminal cases have held that since Oklahoma has not repealed the constitutional disclaimer prohibiting state jurisdiction over Indian country,
67. Id.
68. See, eg., Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 550 F.2d
443, 445 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that ten states, including Oklahoma, have not assumed any
effective jurisdiction over Indian land under Public Law 280).
69. 617 P.2d 177 (Okla. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). In Currey, the court was
required to determine whether the Oklahoma Corporation Commission could order the replugging
of abandoned wells on Choctaw property. Id. at 178. Currey asserted that "because the wells were
drilled on restricted Indian lands Oklahoma [was] without jurisdiction." Id. at 179. The court
noted that section 11 of Public Law 80-336 "withdraws Congress from preemption in the field of oil
and gas conservation and thereby enlarged the sovereignty of Oklahoma to that extent." Id. at 180.
Section 11 reads:
All restricted lands of the Five Civilized Tribes are hereby made subject to all oil and gas
conservation laws of Oklahoma: Provided,That no order of the Corporation Commission
affecting restricted Indian land shall be valid as to such land until submitted to and approved by the Secretary of the Interior or his duly authorized representative.
Act of Aug. 4, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-336, ch. 458, 61 Stat. 731, 734. The court concluded that
federal jurisdiction over Indian land was not exclusive jurisdiction and that the Corporation Commission had the authority to order Currey to replug the wells. Currey, 617 P.2d at 180.
70. Currey, 617 P.2d at 180; see also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 69-76
(1962) (Alaska disclaimer of all rights and title to Indian land does not authorize Indian communities to use fish traps in Alaskan waters in violation of the Alaska Anti-Fish Trap Conservation Law
because such action would violate governmental interests); Ahboah v. Housing Auth. of Kiowa
Tribe, 660 P.2d 625, 630-31 (Okla. 1983) ("disclaimer" language in Oklahoma Constitution presents
no barrier to adjudication of forcible entry and detainer actions involving Indians and Indian property in and of itself, since such act is governmental and the disclaimer clause is a disclaimer of
proprietary rather than governmental interests).
71. Currey, 617 P.2d at 180 (quoting Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 69
(1962)).
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the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over Indian country
located within Oklahoma's boundaries.7 2 At least one criminal case,
however, has held that even if an offense is committed within Indian
country, this does not preclude the State of Oklahoma from applying its
laws. In Goforth v. State,7 3 the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that
Oklahoma's constitutional disclaimer was not to be read so restrictively
as to deny the state the authority to punish crimes within its borders.7 4
In light of the ambiguities in Oklahoma cases addressing the implications of Public Law 280 and the constitutional disclaimer, it is difficult
to determine what position the state could take in enforcing its bingo
laws on tribal land under this federal legislation. The section of Public
Law 280 which allows states to assert criminal jurisdiction over Indian
land provides that the criminal laws of a state shall have the same force
and effect within Indian country as they have elsewhere in the state.7 5 As
for civil jurisdiction, the Law offers little assistance in determining which
civil laws may be enforced. Public Law 280 grants the states
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which
Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country ... to
the same extent that such State ... has jurisdiction over other civil
causes of action, and those civil laws of such State ... that are of
general application to private persons or private property shall have
the same force and effect within"such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State .... 76
It has been determined that this section applies to private causes of
action, but not to state regulatory and licensing laws. Thus, in Bryan v.
Itasca County,7 7 the Supreme Court interpreted Public Law 280 as granting civil jurisdiction to the states only to the extent necessary to resolve
private disputes between Indians and between Indians and private citi72. See State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263, 265 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); accord State v. Burnett, 671 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (noting that according to Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 486 (1979) and Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423
(1971), a constitutional amendment may not be necessary if the state manifests by political action a
willingness and the ability to discharge the new responsibilities); C.M.G. v. State, 594 P.2d 798, 799
(Okla. Crim. App.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
73. 644 P.2d 114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). In Goforth, the defendant argued that since he was
an Indian and committed a murder within Indian country, the state had no jurisdiction over the
matter. Id. at 115. The defendant failed, however, to establish his status as an Indian. Id. at 116.
State jurisdiction was not, therefore, preempted by federal law. Id.
74. Id at 117.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982).
77. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). In Bryan, an enrolled Chippewa Indian brought suit in state court
seeking a declaratory judgment that the State of Minnesota and County of Itasca lacked the authority to impose a property tax on his mobile home which was located on reservation land. Id. at 375.
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zens.78 The Court stated that "if Congress in enacting Pub. L. 280 had
intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have expressly said
'79
SO."
Thus, the mandate from the Supreme Court is that states do not
have general regulatory power over the Indian tribes.
In the event that the disclaimer language in Oklahoma's Constitu-

tion is not deemed an impediment to state jurisdiction over activities
within Indian country, it may prove useful to examine how other states
have interpreted Public Law 280 and its relationship to the enforcement
of state bingo laws on Indian land. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 0 the Seminole tribe sought to enjoin the Sheriff of Broward
County from enforcing Florida's bingo laws on their reservation. 1 The
Seminoles contracted with a private limited partnership that agreed to
build and operate a bingo hall on Seminole land in exchange for a per-

centage of the profits as management fees. 82 Florida bingo laws authorized only charitable or non-profit organizations to engage in bingo.8 3
Moreover, the state prohibited sponsors from being compensated in any
way for operating the games.8 4 The court noted that whether the state
could assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280 turned on the determination of whether Florida's bingo statutes were "civil/regulatory or
criminal/prohibitory in nature. 81 5 The court held that "under a civil/

regulatory versus criminal/prohibitory analysis, we consider the Florida
78. Id. at 383-85. The Court stated that Public Law 280 provided for civil jurisdiction as follows: "[S]ubsection (a) seems to have been primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian
forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and
other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes." Id. at 383.
The Court also noted that:
A fair reading of [Public Law 280] suggests that Congress never intended 'civil laws' to
mean the entire array of state noncriminal laws, but rather that Congress intended 'civil
laws' to mean those laws which have to do with private rights and status. Therefore, 'civil
laws. . . of general application to private persons or private property' would include the
laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc., but would not include laws
declaring or implementing the states' sovereign powers, such as the power to tax, grant
franchises, etc. These are not within the fair meaning of 'private' laws.
Id. at 384 n.10 (quoting Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, TribalSovereignty and Economic Development, 49 N.D.L. REv. 267, 296 (1973)).
79. Id. at 390.
80. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 311.
82. Id.
83. FLA. STAT. § 849.093(2) (1985) (permitting "nonprofit or veterans' organizations engaged
in charitable, civic, community, benevolent, religious, or scholastic works or other similar endeavors,
which organizations have been in existence. . . for a period of 3 years or more" to conduct bingo

games).
84. FLA. STAT. § 849.093(7) (1984).
85. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 311.
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statute in question to determine whether the operation of bingo games is
prohibited as against the public policy of the state or merely regulated by
the state." 86 In finding that bingo was not against the public policy of
the State of Florida, the court held that the bingo statutes were regulatory and, thus, beyond the reach of state jurisdiction under Public Law
280.87

In Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin,8 8 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin similarly addressed the relationship between Public Law 280 and state bingo laws. 89 The Oneidas
operated a bingo hall on tribal property without the assistance of any
profit organizations. 90 Proceeds from bingo operations were appropriated solely for the purposes of promoting the health, education, and welfare of the tribe.91 Wisconsin's Constitution had previously been
amended to provide that the legislature could "authorize bingo games
licensed by the state, and operated by religious, charitable, service, fraternal or veterans' organizations or those to which contributions are deductible for federal or state income tax purposes." 92 The state argued that
the tribe's bingo operations were in violation of state law because Indians
were not one of the groups authorized to play bingo under the constitution.9 3 The State of Wisconsin was granted full criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 to enforce laws on Indian reservations which
prohibit "activities that the state determined are too dangerous, unhealthy, or otherwise detrimental to the well-being of the state's citizens." 94 Nonetheless, the court held that Wisconsin's regulation of bingo
was a civil regulation and that under Public Law 280, Wisconsin had no
authority to enforce its bingo laws on Oneida property. 95 The court
based its decision upon a finding that bingo was not against the public
policy of Wisconsin inasmuch as the state's laws were not designed to
86. Id. at 313.
87. Id. at 314-15. In concluding that bingo was not generally against public policy in Florida,
the court examined the gambling regulation scheme in the state. Id. at 314. It was noted that
Florida does not outlaw bingo, horse racing, dog racing and jai alai outright, but rather excepts them
from the state's lottery prohibition and permits them to be regulated by the state. Id.
88. 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
89. Id. at 716-18.
90. Id. at 713.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 717 (citing Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24(1)). Pursuant to this change in the constitution,
Wisconsin enacted legislation governing the operation of bingo games. Id. (citing WIs. STAT.
§§ 163.03-.74, 945.01-.12 (1974)).
93. Oneida, 518 F. Supp. at 717.
94. Id. at 720.
95. Id. at 719.
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prevent the general populace from playing the game. 96
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in Barona Group of Capitan GrandeBand of Mission Indians v.
Duffy, 97 addressed the applicability of state bingo laws on Indian land.
The Barona Group entered into a management agreement with a corpo-

ration to commence bingo operations on the reservation.98 California
laws authorized cities and counties to provide for bingo games, but only
for charitable purposes. 99 The Sheriff of San Diego County contended
that Public Law 280 gave the state jurisdiction over Indian bingo."'° The

court, however, applied the public policy arguments set forth in Oneida
and Butterworth and held that California bingo laws were regulatory and

of a civil nature.10 Thus, the state could not exercise jurisdiction over
the reservation games." 2
As in Butterworth, Oklahoma law also provides that the charitable
organization running a bingo game cannot form any agreement or contract concerning the operation of the games with other persons or organi-

zations for which consideration or compensation is provided.10 3 Indians
throughout Oklahoma have contracted with corporations to help finance
their bingo halls.1°

Oklahoma law further stipulates that no licensee

may conduct bingo games more than two days per week, that no prize
greater than $200 shall be offered or awarded in any single game of
bingo, and that the aggregate amount of all prizes offered or awarded in a

single session shall not exceed $1,000.105 The Creek Nation plays bingo
96. Id. at 718. "State law governing bingo appears to provide penalties for those who illegally
conduct bingo games rather than for those who merely play in such games." Id. at 719.
97. Barona, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2091 (1983).
98. Id. at 1187.
99. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (West Supp. 1982)).
100. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)).
101. Id. at 1189. The court first established that there was no general prohibition against playing
bingo in California. Id. The court then noted that the sheer number of organizations permitted to
run bingo games mitigates against the games being considered a violation of public policy. Id.
Finally, the court relied on several "rules of construction," including the encouragement of tribal
self-government and the strong historical precedent disfavoring state jurisdiction over reservations,
to find that the bingo laws were not prohibitory. Id. at 1190 (citing, respectively, United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-26 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); MeClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973)). Thus, the court considered the Indian
bingo issue against the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty.
102. Barona, 694 F.2d at 1190.
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 995.1 (Supp. 1984). Florida law states that members of the organization conducting bingo games shall not be compensated in any way. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093(7)
(West 1984). Nonetheless, this provision was found not to act as a bar to the Seminole Indians
operating bingo games under the sponsorship of a limited partnership. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 312.
104. See supra note 3.
105. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 995.10 (Supp. 1984). Other jurisdictions which have addressed Indian bingo have had similar statutes regulating the number of sessions and amount of prizes. For
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daily, offers prizes as high as $1,000 per game, and awards prizes in an
aggregate amount for a single session as high as $12,000.106 It is evident

that Indian bingo is not conducted in compliance with Oklahoma's bingo
laws. Nonetheless, pursuant to the test developed for application of Public Law 280, Oklahoma can impose its bingo laws on Indian bingo operations only if the state's bingo laws are classified as criminal or
prohibitory.
The state may argue that bingo laws are prohibitory in that the purpose of the bingo licensing law is to prohibit entirely the operation of
bingo games except by those organizations issued licenses by the district
court clerk. 0 7 One further argument for bingo laws being classified as
prohibitory is that persons who fail to conduct their bingo games in compliance with state bingo laws are subject to penalties. 108 When analyzing
these arguments in light of the cases previously discussed and with a view
toward Oklahoma's entire gambling regulatory scheme, it appears that
the arguments would likely fail.
As in Butterworth, Oneida, and Barona, public policy would play an
important role in ascertaining whether Oklahoma's bingo laws are regulatory as opposed to prohibitory. In evaluating Oklahoma's bingo laws,

it is apparent that the legislature meant only to regulate bingo, not to
prohibit it entirely. The legislature has the inherent power to prohibit or
regulate any and all forms of gambling. 0 9 Although the Oklahoma Legexample, Florida law states that games can be conducted only two days per week and that no more
than three jackpots per day are permissible. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093 (West 1984); see Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 312. Wisconsin law limits the number of bingo sessions to 54 per year, and no
single prize can exceed $250. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 163.51 (West 1984); see Oneida, 518 F. Supp. at
713, 720 (Indian bingo permissible despite its noncompliance with Wisconsin law). Furthermore,
although Indians operate high-stakes bingo in several other states, this has not been a bar to upholding the legality of Indian bingo games in those states. See, eg., McGregor, Indians Hit Jackpot in
High-StakesBingo Games, Tulsa World, Oct. 25, 1984, at E.1, col. 2 (in Florida, the Seminoles gross
approximately $20 million per year, with annual profits of $3.5 million; in Minnesota, the Sioux
raised $3 million in profits after paying out $6 million in prizes during the first year of operation);
Million-DollarBingo, Tulsa Tribune, June 30, 1983, at A.7, col. 1 (North Carolina Cherokees
charged players a $500 entry fee for the chance to win $1.05 million in prizes, including a $200
thousand final-game prize).
106. See Pratter, 1,000 Folks Put Their Money on New Creek Bingo Game, Tulsa World, Nov.
18, 1984, at A.I, col. 2.
107. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 995.1 (Supp. 1984).
108. Id. § 995.15. Section 995.15 provides that:
Any violation of. . .this title [Bingo Act] is hereby declared to be a public nuisance. Any
person violating the provisions of this act except as otherwise provided in this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by confinement
in the county jail for a period of time not to exceed thirty (30) days and by a fine of not less
than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) and not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00),
or by both such fine and imprisonment.
109. The Oklahoma Constitution provides that "[t]he authority of the Legislature shall extend to
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islature has expressly prohibited some forms of gambling,1 10 bingo ap-

pears to fall within a category of gambling that Oklahoma has chosen to
regulate by imposing certain limitations to avoid abuses."' Thus, the
statutes regulate bingo as a money-making venture by limiting the

number of sessions and the amount of prizes, 1 2 by requiring that the
organization operate without profits to its individual members,"1 ' and by

requiring that the games be operated by volunteers from the authorized
organizations.' 14 That so many diverse organizations are allowed to conduct bingo operations1 5 and that the general populace is permitted to
engage in the games which these organizations sponsor, is contrary to a
finding that such operations violate Oklahoma's public policy. 16

Public policy rationales must be further examined in view of the
"backdrop" of tribal sovereignty.

7

The federal Indian policy of self-

government for Indian tribes works against a finding that Indian bingo is
a violation of Oklahoma's public policy.

8

The explicit purpose of

Oklahoma Indian bingo operations is to collect money for the support of
all rightful subjects of legislation, and any specific grant of authority in this Constitution, upon any
subject whatsoever, shall not work a restriction, limitation, or exclusion of such authority upon the
same or any other subjects whatsoever." OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 36. The legislature is constitutionally vested with the power and authority to pass legislation on any subject not withheld by state or
federal constitutions. See State ex reL Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Daxon, 607 P.2d 683, 687 (Okla. 1980).
110. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1052 (1981) (lotteries are unlawful in Oklahoma).
111. Moreover, the state can no longer claim a "general policy" against most types of gambling,
since the Oklahoma Legislature has recently provided that counties may hold elections to approve
pari-mutuel horse racing. OKLA.STAT. tit. 3A, § 209 (Supp. 1984). Horse racing is regulated by the
state and licensees are required to retain 18% of all money wagered, one-third of which is to be
remitted to the Oklahoma Tax Commission. Id.§ 205.6; see infra notes 156-92 and accompanying
text for analysis of the issue of taxing Indian bingo revenues. An Indian tribe in Oklahoma is currently attempting to locate a parimutuel race track on tribal land in Comanche County without
licensing from the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission. Ervin, Indian Rights vs State: Tax
Agency on Front Line, Tulsa World, May 8, 1985, at A.4, col. 6.
112. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 995.10 (Supp. 1984).
113. Id.§ 995.1.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
116. See, e-g.,
Barona, 694 F.2d at 1189 (noting the importance of these two factors in finding
that California's public policy is not against bingo); accord Oneida, 518 F. Supp. at 719. The same
arguments cannot be made with regard to recent attempts by Indians in Oklahoma to place slot
machines in Indian Country. See Indian Lotteries, Slot Machines Ruled Illegal, Tulsa World, May

1, 1985, at A.1, col. 5. The operation of slot machines is prohibited in Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 970 (1981). A recent opinion of Oklahoma's Assistant Attorney General John Galowitch
found that it would be unlawful for a person within Indian Country in Oklahoma to possess a slot
machine. See 56 OKLA. B.J. 1085 (1985).
117. See, eg., Barona, 694 F.2d at 1189 (discussing the historical precedents of encouraging
tribal self-government and non-state interference with Indian tribal affairs).
118. Federal Indian policy has been addressed by other jurisdictions attempting to regulate Indian bingo. See, eg., Oneida, 518 F. Supp. at 720 (Wisconsin's bingo laws could not be enforced on
the Oneida Reservation; to hold otherwise would be contrary to present Federal policy encouraging
tribal self-government).
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programs to promote the health, education, and general welfare of the

tribes.1 19 High-stakes Indian bingo has meant not only jobs and revenue
for the Indians, but also income for nearby hotels, motels, and restaurants. 120 The intent to better the Indian community is as worthy as the
other charitable purposes to which bingo proceeds are authorized under

Oklahoma bingo statutes. 121 Although Indian bingo operations do not
fully comply with the letter of the statutory scheme, they do at least fall
within the general tenor of its permissive intent and should not be viewed

as against public policy.
Finally, an argument that the bingo law is criminal because it has a

penal provision would likely fail. First, such a conclusion would transform numerous purely regulatory statutes into prohibitory ones, thus depriving Indians of a significant degree of control over their sovereign
territories. 122 Second, the statute provides a penalty only for those who
illegally conduct bingo games, rather than for those who merely play the

game. 123
B.

The Assimilative Crimes Act

The state could attempt to curtail Indian bingo activity through the
use of the Assimilative Crimes Act.12 4 In United States v. Marcyes,1 25 the

Puyallup Indian tribe sold fireworks to the public at a fireworks stand on
tribal land in Washington. 126 The state asserted jurisdiction over the ac-

tivity through the Assimilative Crimes Act which provides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now [under the jurisdiction of the United States], is guilty of any act or omission which,
although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would
119. See Cass, Bingo! Money From Enterprises Helps Indians Go Forward, Tulsa World, Jan. 1,
1984, at A.14, col. 4 (bingo proceeds are used "to build and staff health- and day-care centers, to
provide college scholarships, to hire lobbyists, to contribute to political campaigns and to make up
for the Reagan administration's budget cuts in welfare programs").
120. See, eg., Neal, Bingo! Indian Nations Hit the Jackpot, Tulsa Tribune, Jul. 29, 1984, at B.1,
col. 6 ("hotel[s] and motels in the area, hurting for business, are happily awaiting busloads of bingo

players").
121. See, e.g., Barona,694 F.2d at 1190 (noting that the betterment of the Indian community is a
worthy purpose).
122. See, eg., Oneida, 518 F. Supp. at 720 ("Congress did not intend to allow states to use
licensing requirements in an attempt to create jurisdiction to enforce otherwise civil regulations on
Indian reservations").
123. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 995.15 (Supp. 1984); see also Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 316 ("The
courts that have prohibited Indians or non-Indians from gambling on reservations have done so in
light of a statute that specifically prohibits the act of gambling.") (emphasis added).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
125. 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977).
126. Id. at 1363.
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be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the
State. .. in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force
at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and
subject to a like punishment. 27
The Act essentially transforms the laws of a state into federal law.

Thus, when no federal law specifically addresses a particular crime, the
state law is applied through the Assimilative Crimes Act to individuals
on federal territory within the boundaries of the state. The Assimilative
Crimes Act is applied to Indian reservations through the General Crimes
Act 128 which provides that the general criminal laws of the United States

129
shall extend to Indian lands.
The Puyallups argued that the Assimilative Crimes Act was inapplicable to their fireworks sales because the Act only incorporates the general criminal code or prohibitory laws of the state and Washington's
fireworks laws were merely penal provisions of regulatory laws.130 Nonetheless, the court found that the fireworks laws were criminal and prohibitory in that their purpose was to "promote the safety and health of all
citizens." 13 1 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the regulation of prostitution in Nevada was within the purview of the
Assimilative Crimes Act and, thus, the Department of the Interior could
prohibit Moapa Indians from operating houses of prostitution on the

reservation. 132
127. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
128. Id. § 1152.
129. The General Crimes Act provides: "Mhe general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States ... shall extend to the Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982). Since the Assimilative
Crimes Act is applicable to Indian reservations only through the General Crimes Act, it is subject to
the latter's exceptions. See Guzman, Indian Gambling on Reservations: Organized Crime orAssimilative Crime?, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 209, 217 (1982). The General Crimes Act does not extend to:
(1) offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian; (2) any
Indian committing any offense in Indian country who has been punished by tribal law; or (3) "any
case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured
to the Indian tribes respectively." 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982); see also Williams v. United States, 327
U.S. 711, 713 (1946) (Court indicated that the Assimilative Crimes Act applies to Indian reservations through the General Crimes Act).
130. Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364.
131. Id.
132. Moapa Band of Paiute Indians v. United States Dep't of Interior, 747 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1984). In Moapa, the Phoenix Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs rescinded a tribal
ordinance permitting the licensing of houses of prostitution on a Paiute reservation. Id. at 564.
Although Nevada law permits counties having populations of less than 25,000 persons to license the
operation of houses of prostitution, the county in which the reservation was located had a population
of 250,000, thus brothels were not permitted. Id. (citing NEv.REv. STAT. § 244.345(8) (1981)),
One of the justifications for rescinding the ordinance which was offered by the Department of Interior was that both Indians and non-Indians would be subject to arrest under the Assimilative Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), which makes punishable as a federal crime any act committed on federal
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Oklahoma could argue that the state can prohibit Indian bingo
under this Act. Once again, the counterargument is that the penalties for
violations of Oklahoma's bingo laws are merely penal provisions of a regulatory law and, as such, the Assimilative Crimes Act is inapplicable.
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co.,'3 3
indicated that a strong argument exists that Congress did not intend to
include the penal provisions of a state regulatory system within the As-

similative Crimes Act.' 34 The rationale for this argument is obvious: "a
state could thereby enforce its regulatory system on the federal jurisdiction by making criminal any failure to comply with those regulations."'' 35
This argument is even stronger with respect to Indian lands because a
state could attempt to use the Act to implement all of its regulatory proreservations and thus destroy the concept of tribal
visions on Indian
36
sovereignty.'
C.

The Organized Crime Control Act

Finally, Oklahoma could attempt to eliminate Indian bingo through
38
1 37
In United States v. Farris,1
use of the Organized Crime Control Act.
the Puyallup tribe in Washington operated profitable casinos featuring

blackjack, poker and dice on tribal land.' 39 The casinos were open to the
public and many non-Indians and out-of-staters participated in the
games."' ° The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington obtained jurisdiction over these activities through the Or-

ganized Crime Control Act, which makes it a federal crime to operate a
large scale gambling business in violation of state law.14

land which would be a state crime if committed in the state surrounding the area. Id. The Department also noted that although the federal government encourages the economic development of
Indian reservations, the revenues generated by prostitution were "not the kind of economic developFurthermore, the "licensing and operation of brothels on
ment envisioned by federal policy." I
the Moapa Reservation would bring about a political reaction adverse to Moapa and other Indian
tribes." Id.
133. 321 U.S. 383 (1944).
134. Id. at 389 n.8.
135. Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364.
136. See Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712, 715-19 (W.D.Wis. 1981).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982).
138. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1980).
139. Id. at 893.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 892 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976)). The Organized Crime Control Act was intended to reach the heart of organized crime. See, eg., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786
(1975) (basic purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act was "to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States"); United States v. Grezo, 566 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1977) ("examination
of the legislative-history of § 1955 indicates. . . that Congress intended to reach all manifestations
of large-scale organized crime"); United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1974) (Organ-
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The Puyallups argued that the Act did not apply to them and that

even if it did, they were not guilty of violating it because their casinos
were on Indian land which was outside of the jurisdiction of Washing-

ton's gambling laws. 42 The court disagreed and held that the Act was a
federal law and that federal laws generally applicable throughout the
United States apply with equal force to Indians on Indian land.' 4 3
The Puyallup's gambling activities are analogous to Indian bingo in
Oklahoma. Indian bingo halls are operated on tribal land and are open
to the public."4 Many non-Indians and out-of-staters participate in the
high-stakes games.' 4 5 Indian bingo also meets the definition of "illegal

gambling" as set forth in the Organized Crime Control Act which defines
illegal gambling as gambling which is "a violation of the law of a State
. . .[involving] five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business. . . in substantially
continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross
revenue of $2,000 in any single day."' 4 6 Indian bingo can be said to be a

violation of state law because of noncompliance with the licensing requirements or jackpot limitations. 1" Furthermore, Indian bingo halls
are generally operated by more than five persons 148 and gross more than
$2,000 per day.' 4 9
While the analysis in Farris seems applicable to Indian bingo in
Oklahoma, there is an important distinction between the Indian gam-

bling casinos in Washington and the Indian bingo halls in Oklahoma.
The particular gambling activities engaged in by the Puyallups were
against Washington's public policy.' 5 0 Organized blackjack, poker, and
ized Crime Control Act "was aimed at curtailing syndicated gambling, the lifeline of organized
crime"). At least one commentator has argued that the Act was never intended to apply to gambling
on an Indian reservation which was not within the reach of state law. See Guzman, supra note 129,
at 222 (Organized Crime Control Act and Assimilative Crimes Act examined to determine their
applicability to the facts in United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980)).
142. Farris,624 F.2d at 893-94.
143. Id The court found that the Puyallup gambling activities were a violation of Washington's
gambling laws for purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act. Id. at 895.
144. See Pratter, supra note 3, at F.1, col. 1.
145. See, eg., Everly-Douze, Big Prizes Attracting Crowds to Indian Bingo Hall, Tulsa World,
Nov. 11, 1984, at A.I, col. 1 ("would-bejackpotters endure overnight bus trips from as far away as
Chicago and McAllen, Texas, on the Mexican border, to pack the hall" at the Otoe-Missouria Indian Tribe's bingo hall in Red Rock, Oklahoma).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b) (1982).
147. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
148. See, e-g., Pratter, supra note 3, at F.1, col. 2 (Creek bingo hall in Tulsa is operated by
members of the tribe and by consultants from Indian Country USA; the hall has provided approximately 125 jobs).
149. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
150. Farris, 624 F.2d at 895.
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dice which are operated for profit are not freely engaged in by members
of the general public in Washington. 15 1 Bingo, on the other hand, is not
in that the games are played by memagainst Oklahoma's public 5policy
2
bers of the general public.1
There is also a serious defect in the Farriscourt's reasoning. First, it
stated that Washington could not enforce its gambling laws against the
Puyallups on Indian land 5 3 and then it held that the Indian gambling
activities were a violation of the law of the state for purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act.'5 4 This interpretation of the statute is untenable. It exceeds the limits of reasonable statutory construction to hold
that conduct which could not be punished under a state law is nonetheless a violation of that same state law. Furthermore, the idea that a person can transgress state law by conduct not punishable under that state
law is inconsistent with minimum notions of notice and fairness. 55
D.

The Cigarette and Liquor Cases and the Issue of Taxation

The tension between states and tribal governments has become particularly acute in the area of state taxation of reservation activities. In
the event Oklahoma attempts to regulate Indian bingo through taxation,
a different analysis from that presented in the previous sections may be
used to attack the state's alleged right to tax this source of revenue.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,'5 6 the Supreme Court upheld Washington's state sales tax on cigarette sales by Colville Indians to non-Indians and non-member
Indians."' Prior to this decision, the Colville tribes were able to sell
cigarettes at prices much lower than off-reservation shops because no
state sales tax was collected.' 5 8 The income earned from reservation
smokeshops was exempt from state taxation because the tribes were
deemed to have been under federal control and to have occupied federal
trust lands.' 59 Most of the tribes' cigarette business was generated be151. Id.; see WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.46.010, 9.46.220 (1977).
152. See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
153. Farris,624 F.2d at 895.
154. Id.
155. See Guzman, supra note 129, at 221 ("Because the Indians were innocent under state law,
prosecuting them under the gambling statute was a violation of due process.").
156. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
157. Id. at 161; see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.24.260 (Supp. 1981). The tax immunity is
based on membership in a tribal government, not on race. Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61. A nonmember Indian on a reservation does not possess the same immunities afforded a member. Id.
158. Colville, 447 U.S. at 145.
159. Indians and reservation activities were originally immune from state taxation because the
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cause of this exemption; the low prices attracted non-Indian purchasers
from surrounding areas.1 60 Furthermore, each Colville tribe raised sig61
nificant revenue for its own use by placing a tax on the sales.'
The Court upheld the state cigarette sales tax for two reasons. First,
although the Court recognized that the state taxation scheme would deprive the tribes of business and revenue, it refused to find that Washington's action was preempted by federal Indian law. 162 No federal act
authorized the tribes to market their tax exemption to non-Indians by
enacting tribal taxing ordinances and no federal act hindered the state's
ability to collect the sales tax from non-members. 163 Second, the Court
applied the infringement test and found that the state's interest in raising
revenues outweighed the Indians' right to self-government. 164 The intribes were considered to be distinct political communities under the exclusive control of Congress.
See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755-56 (1886). In Kansas Indians, the Court rejected
state efforts to impose a land tax on reservation Indians. Id. at 757. The federal instrumentality
doctrine, which exempts federal lands from state taxation, was also asserted as a basis for tax immunity for reservations. Id.; see also United States v. Thurston County, 143 F. 287 (8th Cir. 1906),
providing that:
Lands allotted to Indians, inalienable for certain periods of time during which they arc
held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the allotees and their heirs . . . are
exempt from taxation by any state or county during the period of the trust, because they
are instrumentalities lawfully employed by the nation in the exercise of its powers of government to protect, support, and instruct the Indians.
Id. at 287. The federal instrumentality doctrine was later rejected in Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1973), where the state was allowed to impose taxes on a ski resort
operated by Indians on land leased from the federal government. The Court has returned to tribal
sovereignty as the basis for immunity. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 170-71 (1973) ("State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply . . . . Indians and
Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to State taxation except by virtue of express
authority conferred upon the State by act of Congress.") (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845 (1958)).
160. Colville, 447 U.S. at 145. The tribes argued that since they imposed their own tax on cigarette sales, the additional state tax would drive cigarette prices up and the tribes would be placed at a
competitive disadvantage as compared to businesses elsewhere. Id. at 154.
161. Id at 145. For example, from 1972 through 1976, the Colville tribe raised approximately
$266,000 from its cigarette tax; the Lummi tribe realized $54,000; the Makah tribe raised $13,000;
and the Yakima tribe realized $278,000. Id. at 144-45.
162. Id. at 154.
163. Id. at 155-56. The tribes asserted the power to create state tax exemptions "by imposing
their own taxes or otherwise earning revenues by participating in the reservation enterprises." Id. at
155. The Court stated that if this assertion were true, "the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and
open chains of discount stores at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas." Id. The Court concluded that no principle of
federal Indian law authorized tribes to market an exemption from state taxation to customers who
would normally do their business elsewhere. Id. The Court stated that neither the mere fact of
federal approval of the Indian taxing ordinances, nor the fact that tribes exercise congressionally
sanctioned powers of self-government preempted state sales tax on cigarettes sold to non-members of
the tribe. Id
164. Id. at 156. Although the taxes would deprive the tribes of substantial revenues, Washing-
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fringement test consists of determining whether state law conflicts with
tribal self-government.' 6 5 If there is a conflict, the state intrusion is invalid.' 6 6 A state may only extend its civil laws onto a reservation if there is
1 67
no conflict.
In accordance with Colville, it is clear that a state may tax nonIndians on a reservation, even if the non-Indians are already taxed by the
tribe. 168 What is not clear is the proof required to invalidate a state tax
because of its infringement on tribal self-government. The standard to
which courts will hold the burdened tribe is difficult to ascertain. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did, however, establish a standard in
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana.1 9 In invalidating a Montana tax, the
court stated that: "[T]he Tribe must show that the taxes substantially
affect its ability to offer governmental services or its ability to regulate the
development of tribal resources, and that the balance of state and tribal
interests renders the state's assertion of taxing authority
70
unreasonable." 1
If the State of Oklahoma attempts to tax non-Indian bingo players,
tribes engaged in bingo operations will likely claim that the state tax is an
infringement upon their right to govern themselves. Under the test developed in Crow, they will have to show that the tax substantially affects
their ability to govern themselves or their ability to regulate the development of tribal resources. If Oklahoma is allowed to tax non-Indian bingo
players, the players may journey to off-reservation bingo halls to avoid
the tax, resulting in a severe loss of revenue for the tribes.' 7 ' Tribes utilize bingo profits to support their schools, clinics, and recreational facilities.' 72 Tribal governments would, however, have to show in detailed
figures how severely a state tax will damage their economic standing.
Nonetheless, it is likely that the courts would rather see Indians generate
ton's actions did not infringe upon the right of the reservation Indians to "make their own laws and
be ruled by them." Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
165. See Lytle, supra note 19, at 75.
166. Id.

167. Id.
168. Colville, 447 U.S. at 151.
169. 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981).
170. Id. at 1117.
171. Over $1 million was generated through admission fees alone at Creek Nation bingo games
in Oklahoma from December, 1984 through February, 1985. Letter from Sherrin Watkins of Muskogee Creek Nation Office of Justice to Stefanie Lorbiecki (March 28, 1985) (discussing Creek Nation bingo operations). On the other hand, it has been estimated that the state is losing about $1.6
million in sales tax annually which could be raised from Indian bingo facilities in Oklahoma. Myers,
House Approves Indian Tribes Bill, Tulsa World, Mar. 15, 1985, at A.1, col. 5.
172. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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their own income than depend on the federal government for economic
assistance.
Since its decision in Colville, the Supreme Court has moved even
further from the concept of tribal sovereignty. In Rice v. Rehner 173 the
Court held that existing federal control over liquor regulation did not
preempt state licensing of liquor vendors on Indian reservations. 174 The
Court abruptly diverged from prior preemption decisions by stating that
it need not automatically consider tribal sovereignty as a backdrop
against which to examine existing federal regulations in liquor licensing.175 Instead, the Court held that if the case did not involve "a tradition of sovereignty" or if the state's interests in regulation outweighed
those of the tribe and the federal government, use of the "backdrop"
analysis would be inappropriate.1 7 6 The Court concluded by noting that
"[a] State's regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the State
' 177
can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate State intervention.
Rehner leaves unanswered several questions regarding state regulation of Indian activities. First, Rehner created an exception to the preemption barrier by holding that the state could regulate an area not
under "a tradition of sovereignty" by the tribe, 178 but it did not address
the effect of this exception on infringement of tribal sovereignty. Specifically, the Court failed to state whether the infringement test still constitutes an independent barrier to the assumption of state regulatory
jurisdiction in Indian country. 179
Second, the Court in Rehner failed to define "a tradition of tribal
sovereignty." In finding that no tradition of tribal sovereignty existed in
Rehner, the Court relied upon the fact that colonists had regulated Indian liquor trading long before any tribal regulatory attempts.180 This
may mean that the Court will refuse to recognize an Indian tradition of
sovereignty unless the tribe attempts regulation of a field before any state
authority is asserted. 8 1 Furthermore, even if a tribe asserts regulatory
jurisdiction over a field prior to the state, this may not be sufficient to
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
tour, 25
180.
181.

103 S. Ct. 3291 (1983).
Id.at 3299.
Id. at 3295.
Id. at 3296-98.
Id. at 3298 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 2387 (1983)).
Rehner, 103 S.Ct. at 3298.
See Ryan, Confusion in the Land of Indian Sovereignty: The Supreme Court Takes a De.
ARIZ. L. REv. 1059, 1067 (1983).
Rehner, 103 S.Ct. at 3297.
See Ryan, supra note 179, at 1067.
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constitute "a tradition of sovereignty."1 2
Third, it is difficult to determine what effect Rehner will have on a
state's ability to tax the sale of liquor within a reservation. In Colville,
the Court upheld the imposition of state taxes on cigarette sales made to
non-Indians and non-members, but precluded state taxation of cigarette
sales to members of the Colville tribe.18 3 As one commentator has noted:
Consistent application of Colville would allow state liquor taxation
only on sales to non-Indians and non-tribal members. This result,
however, would leave the Court in the anomalous position of holding
that tribal sovereignty is infringed by state taxation of on-reservation
liquor purchases by tribal members, but that it is not infringed by state
regulation or potentional preclusion of the sale entirely. 8
The same conclusion would follow if Oklahoma attempted to tax
non-Indians and non-members of the tribe operating a bingo hall. Inas18 5
much as there is currently no federal regulation over Indian bingo,
federal preemption analysis is inapplicable and infringement analysis
would have to be applied. Consistent application of Colville would leave
the Court in the anomalous position of finding that tribal sovereignty is
infringed by state taxation of Indians at Indian bingo halls, but that it is
not infringed by state taxation or regulation of the games entirely.
It could also be argued that Rehner's consideration of the "traditions of sovereignty" is equally applicable to the infringement test. Thus,
Indian bingo may have to be examined under this new consideration. It
does not seem likely, however, that a state can regulate Indian activities
based on tradition analysis alone. The Supreme Court's analysis of cases
involving infringements on tribal sovereignty has never turned on
whether the particular area being regulated is traditionally within the
tribe's control. In Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, i8 6 for example, the Court held that federal regulation of Indian
schools precluded the imposition of a state tax on construction of such a
school.1 7 The Court did not find it relevant that federal policy had not
encouraged the development of Indian-controlled institutions until the
182. Id.

183. Colville, 447 U.S. at 154-60.
184. Ryan, supra note 179, at 1067.
185. See infra notes 193-207 and accompanying text (discussing proposed Indian Gambling
Control Act).
186. 458 U.S. 832 (1982). In Ramah, a tribal school board protested the imposition of a New
Mexico tax on the gross receipts that a non-Indian construction company received from the school
board for the construction of a school for Indian children on the reservation. Id. at 834. The Court
held that the tax was preempted by the "comprehensive federal regulatory scheme and the express
federal policy of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency in the area of education." Id. at 846.
187. Id. at 841-45.
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early 1970's or that the school in question was "the first independent

Indian school in modem times." '
In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes,' 9 the Court held that a state could not require the operator of an
on-reservation smokeshop to obtain a state cigarette retailer's license but

did not consider whether tribal Indians traditionally had exercised regulatory authority over cigarette sales.' 90 Moreover, in Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 19' the Court concluded that a state could not impose a use
tax on personalty installed at ski lifts at a tribal resort, 192 yet it could
hardly be argued that the construction of ski resorts is a matter with

which Indian tribes historically have been concerned. Thus, while the
state does traditionally control non-Indian bingo operations, it does not

necessarily follow that tradition analysis alone will preclude Indian bingo
or allow the state to tax it.
IV.

THE INDIAN GAMBLING CONTROL ACT

While Indian bingo does not appear to violate Oklahoma's public
policy, concern has arisen regarding the tribes' inability to provide adequate safeguards against criminal activities associated with high-stakes
Indian bingo.193 The explosion of high-stakes Indian bingo operations
has state and federal law enforcement officials anxious about being unable to police an industry which they believe is already attracting
criminals. 94 The issue of who is to police bingo operations on Indian
188. Id. at 834.
189. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). In Moe, members of the confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes in
Montana brought actions challenging the state's cigarette sales taxes and personal property taxes on
motor vehicles as applied to reservation Indians. Id. at 465. The tribe also challenged the state's
vendor licensing statute as applied to tribal members who sold cigarettes at reservation smokeshops.
Id. The Court held that Montana was barred from imposing cigarette sales taxes on sales by tribal
members to Indians residing on the reservation; from imposing the vendor license fee on tribal members operating smokeshops on the reservation; and from imposing a personal property tax as a condi.
tion precedent to registration of a motor vehicle. Id. at 480-81. The Court did, however, allow the

state to tax cigarette sales to non-Indians. Id. at 483.
190. Id. at 483.
191. 411 U.S. 145 (1973). The Mescalero Apache Tribe operated a ski resort in New Mexico on
land outside the boundaries of the tribe's reservation. Id. at 146. The state assessed a $26,086.47
income tax on the gross receipts of the ski resort and a $5,887.19 use tax against the tribe, based on
the purchase price of materials used to construct ski lifts at the resort. Id. at 146-47. Although the
state could tax the gross receipts of the ski resort, it could not impose a use tax on personalty which
had been "permanently attached to the realty." Id. at 158. Inasmuch as the land in question was
not subject to state property taxes, the permanent improvements upon the land were not subject to
state taxation. Id.
192. Id. at 158.
193. See, eg., Stephenson, supra note 23, at C.8, col. 2 ("sudden growth of Indian bingo has
generated concern in the law enforcement community" and the basis of that concern is the attraction
that lucrative gambling operations have for organized crime).
194. See McGregor, supranote 105, at E.1, col. I ("large amounts of cash act as a magnet and a
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land in Oklahoma is also controversial. Unlike some states where Indian
land or reservations comprise large tracts, Oklahoma has scores of small
plots of Indian allotment land where only federal officials have authorthroughity. 195 These plots form a checkerboard pattern of Indian lands
196

out Oklahoma and their boundaries are difficult to locate.

The Indian Gambling Control Act1 97 has been introduced into Congress in response to the problem of inadequate supervision over Indian

gambling activities. 198 The Act recognizes that "tribal operation and icensing of gambling activities is a legitimate means of generating revenues. ' 19 9 The principle goal of federal Indian policy of "promot[ing]

tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments" is also noted in the Act.2 "°

While the Indian Gambling Control Act recognizes the benefits of
tribal gambling activities, it also attempts to establish federal standards
and regulations for the conduct of gambling activities within Indian
country. 20 1 The Act legalizes gambling within Indian country only if it is
conducted by tribal ordinance and approved by the Secretary of the Interior.20 2 The bill prohibits, however, any type of gambling that is prohibsource of potential corruption"); Marler, Congress to Examine ControversialIndian Gambling Bill,
Tulsa World, June 18, 1984, at A.1, col. I (allegations of organized crime having infiltrated Indian
bingo games).
195. See Crime Threat Raises Concerns, Tulsa World, June 20, 1984, at A.14, col. 2.
196. Id. at A.14, col. 3.
197. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (microfiche at Y 1.4/6:98-(NOS.)). The most recent version of this bill is H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). H.R. 1920 is virtually the same as
its predecessor H.R. 4566. Moreover, an Indian Gaming Control Act was introduced in the Senate
on April 4, 1985. S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The primary difference between the House's
bill and the Senate's bill is that the Senate's version provides for the establishment of Indian-controlled Gaming Commissions to oversee Indian gambling activities. S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 11 (1985).
198. See, eg., Marler, IndianLeaders Not in Favor ofProposedGaming Law, Tulsa World, June
20, 1984, at A.14, col. 3 (Indian Gambling Control Act was introduced "under the guise" of protecting tribal games from being infiltrated by organized crime).
199. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1983) (microfiche at Y 1.4/6:98-(NOS.)).
200. Id.
201. "Gambling" is defined by the Act to mean "deal, operate, carry on, conduct, or maintain
for play any banking or percentage game or other game of chance played for money, property,
credit, or any representative value." Id. § 4. "Gambling" does not include "social games played
solely for prizes of minimal value or games played in private homes or residences for prizes of
minimal value, or traditional forms of Indian gambling engaged in by individuals as part of or in
connection with tribal ceremonies or celebrations." Id.
"Indian Country" includes "(a) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation, and (b) any
lands title to which is either held by the United States in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or
individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United States
against alienation." Id.
202. Id. § 6.
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ited by federal or state law, as opposed to merely regulated.2 0 3 For
example, Oklahoma Indians would not be allowed to operate lotteries
since lotteries are currently prohibited under Oklahoma law. 2 4 Tribes
may still contract with outside firms to operate bingo games, but only if
the firms are paid a flat fee instead of a percentage of gross revenue.20 5
This will deter management firms from taking more than their fair share
of the profits. Also, tribes must provide detailed information on bingo
operators to check against felony or gambling convictions, and agree to
open all records for the Department of Interior's inspection and audit.20 6
The Indian Gambling Control Act is in accordance with the federal
Indian policy that tribes should begin to meet the needs of their constituents, and assume greater responsibility for the cost of running their government. 20 7 It is important to the concept of self-government that tribes
reduce their dependence on federal funds by providing a greater percentage of their independent governing costs. Profits from Indian bingo operations may provide the tribes with the opportunity to realize that goal.
V.

CONCLUSION

Indians in Oklahoma should be allowed to continue operating bingo
halls free from state regulation. It is clear that Oklahoma cannot regulate Indian bingo pursuant to Public Law 280, the Organized Crime Control Act or the Assimilative Crimes Act.2 0 Recent developments in state
taxation of cigarette and liquor sales on Indian land demonstrate, however, that Indian tribes must prove that state regulation is unreasonable
before a tax will be invalidated. 20 9 The state tax will be deemed unreasonable if the field it seeks to regulate has been preempted by federal law
2 10
or if the tax infringes upon the Indians' right to self-government.
203. Id.; accord H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., § 6 (1985); S. 902, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., § 6
(1985).
204. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1052 (1981).
205. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7 (1983) (microfiche at Y 1.4/6:98-(NOS.)). The new
House bill would permit an outside firm to take a percentage of gross or net revenues, providing that
the fee does not exceed forty percent of net revenues and "the contractor has made or is committed
to make a significant financial contribution to the tribal gaming operation" or the percentage-based
fee will only be in effect for the first two years of operation. H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., Ist Sss., § 7(c)

(1985). The Senate bill would permit a fee of up to forty-nine percent of net revenues from an
operation. S. 902, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., § 7(a) (1985).
206. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 7, 8 (1983); accord H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., Ist Sss.,
§§ 7, 8 (1985); S. 902, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., §§ 7, 8 (1985).
207. See Chen, Vhat About Colville?, 8 AM. INDAN L. REv. 161, 169 (1980).
208. See supra notes 53-155 and accompanying text.

209. See supra notes 156-92 and accompanying text.
210. Id

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss4/4

28

Lorbiecki: Indian Sovereignty versus Oklahoma's Gambling Laws

1985]

INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY

While the Rehner decision redefined basic principles of preemption analysis in Indian law by upholding an unprecedented extension of state regulatory jurisdiction within Indian country, judicial precedent does not
warned, this
adequately support such an extension. As Justice Blackmun
2 11
"is activism in which [the] Court should not indulge."
While the State of Oklahoma appears to be precluded from taxing or
otherwise regulating Indian bingo, it remains apprehensive regarding the
Indians' inability to properly police bingo operations. A federal act
would be for the mutual benefit of both the state and the tribes. Like the

Indian Gambling Control Act, federal legislation should contain comprehensive regulations to ensure that bingo operations are conducted hon-

estly and efficiently. To benefit the tribes, the legislation should contain
regulations which curb the amount of profits outside firms can demand

and which provide that all profits will be used to fund tribal governmental operations and programs. None of the Indian bingo profits should
inure to the benefit of the federal government. Federal guidelines such as
those contained in the Indian Gambling Control Act are preferable to
state regulatory attempts because state regulatory attempts would result
in state attorneys general and other local public officials attempting to
define and interpret the authority of Indian tribes. Both the state and the

Indians will be better off with a national framework to protect Indian
fundraising activities.
Stefanie A. Lorbiecki
211. Rehner, 103 S.Ct. at 3308 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Authors Note" In a recent decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of actions brought by the State of Oklahoma to enjoin the
Seneca-Cayuga and Quapaw Indian Tribes from conducting bingo games. See State v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma, 56 OKLA.B.J. 1554 (July 2, 1985). The court first found that the games
were being conducted in "Indian Country," as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c). Id. at 1556. The
court held that when neither federal preemption, nor the infringement of tribal self-government is
involved in a state's attempt to regulate activities on Indian land, then the test shifts from one of
"'strict compliance with P.L. 280' to the presence of state residuary powers." Id. at 1558. A balancing approach is to be used to resolve competing tribal and state interests. Id. The court balanced
the state's regulatory interest, the tribe's stake in self-government and the federal policies and concluded that "state residuary jurisdiction" could be exercised "only to the extent that tribal activity in
Indian Country takes on a form that necessarily affects non-Indians and Indians who are nonmembers of the self-governing tribal unit." Id. The causes were remanded for a determination of the
state's residuary jurisdictional powers under the facts presented.
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